Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

State of Utah v. Jason Edward Payne : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Andrea J. Garland; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Counsel for Appellant.
Jeanne B. Inouye; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Carlos A.
Esqueda; Matthew J. Nielsen; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorneys; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Payne, No. 20000497 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2796

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000497-CA

vs.
JASON EDWARD PAYNE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING

JOAN C. WATT
ANDREA J. GARLAND
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JEANNE B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA
MATTHEW J. NIELSEN
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorneys

Counsel forpPP e U ee FILEED
jp 1 Utah Court of Appeals
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

Counsel for Appellant

^
*—

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

O F F I C E OF T H E A T T O R N E Y

GENERAL

•J^LED
Utah Court of Appeals

KA.1 S S 2001
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
M A R K L.
SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAY HINTZE

RYAN MECHAM

KIRK TORGENSEN

Chief Deputy - Civil

Chief of Staff

Chief Deputy - Criminal

March 7, 2001

Ms. Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0230
Re: State v. Payne, Case No. 20000497-CA
Utah R. App. P. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Stagg:
Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am citing to State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978), in support of the State' position at oral argument that
a sentencing judge abuses his discretion only if he imposes a sentence that no reasonable
jurist would have imposed. Oral argument in this matter was held February 23, 2001.
I appreciate your prompt distribution of this letter to the Court.
Sincerely,

MA~£
^NNE B. INOUYE
assistant Attorney General
cc: Joan C. Watt, counsel for appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 20000497-CA

vs.
JASON EDWARD PAYNE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING
JEANNE B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

JOAN C. WATT
ANDREA J. GARLAND
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CARLOS A. ESQUEDA
MATTHEW J. NIELSEN
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorneys

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT,
THE COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM
IN ABSENTIA
A.
B.

II.

III.

7

Defendant, who was free on release, waived his right
to be present at sentencing when he failed to appear

7

The court was not required to make an express warning
that defendant would be sentenced in absentia

8

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY ON AN INACCURATE
FINDING OF FACT WHEN IT DETERMINED THE
SENTENCE

12

THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT PREVENT COUNSEL
FROM PRESENTING INFORMATION IN MITIGATION

14

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION IS REQUESTED
ADDENDA
Addendum A - Findings of Fact and Order dated May 11,2000 (R. 33-35)
Addendum B - Transcript of hearing on March 31,2000 (R. 48)
Addendum C - Transcript of hearing on May 5,2000 (R. 49)

<

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17(1973)
United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

10
9, 10

United States ex rel. Rosemond v. Smith, 1994 WL 119108 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

11

United States v. Taylor, 478 F.2d689 (1st Cir. 1973)

10

Wingate v. Scully, 764 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)

11

STATE CASES
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996)

6, 7, 8, 9

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

16

State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689 (Ariz. App. 1986)

18

State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

14

State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah App. 1993)

13

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991)

2

State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997)

16

State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986)

14

FEDERAL STATUTES
Fed. R. Crim. P. 22

16

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43

9
iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000)

1, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

Utah R. Crim. P. 17

2, 8

Utah R. Crim. P. 22

2, 4, 8, 14
OTHER WORKS CITED

Christopher Hall, Annotation, Voluntary Absence ofAccused When Sentence
Is Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th 135 (1998)

11

i

i

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000497-CA

vs.
JASON EDWARD PAYNE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted unlawful possession or use
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Sentencing in absentia. Did the sentencing court err when it sentenced defendant
in absentia, where defendant had notice of the hearing and was free to attend, but did
not?
2. Findings of fact. Did the trial court rely on an inaccurate finding of fact when
it determined the sentence?
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3. Information in mitigation. Did the sentencing court deny defense counsel
the opportunity to present information in mitigation and, if so, did the denial constitute
plain error?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Where a sentencing decision
involves a question of law, appellate review is under the "correctness of error"
standard. Id. Review of factual findings is for clear error. See id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions:
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2).
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally
present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of
the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if
defendant had been present;.. .
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b).
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue
or alter bail or recognizance.
2
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Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of
sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). R. 2. On February 2, 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to
attempted unlawful possession, a class A misdemeanor. R. 10. The court accepted
his guilty plea, informed him that sentencing was set for March 31, and ordered him
to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of a presentence
report. R. 18-20.
Defendant appeared on March 31, but the presentence report had not been
prepared. Defendant stated that he had not completed his interviews with AP&P
first because he didn't have his case number and then because he needed to get
proof of his employment and his high school diploma. He indicated that he now
had his paperwork, that he had reported to AP&P two weeks prior to his sentencing
date, and that AP&P needed more time. The sentencing court granted defendant a
continuance until May 5, ordered him to appear at AP&P as soon as he left the
3
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courtroom, and warned his that he was in a "very precarious situation" due to his
delays. R. 48:5.
On May 3 AP&P filed a letter with the court stating that a report could not be
completed in time for the sentencing hearing on May 5. Defendant had made an
appointment for April 6, but when AP&P called to confirm, a family member
indicated that defendant had not filled out his packet. AP&P rescheduled for April
13, but defendant did not appear. AP&P advised the court that it could not
complete the presentence report due to defendant's failure to appear, and the court
issued a non-bailable warrant for his arrest. R. 28.
On May 5 defendant's counsel appeared, but indicated that she had had no
contact with defendant. The court noted that defendant had been told both orally
and in writing to appear on that date for sentencing and had been ordered to contact
AP&P for preparation of the presentence report. That fact, together with his failure
to contact either counsel or the court, led the court to conclude that he had
voluntarily "not chosen to comply with the terms of this Court's order." R. 49:3.
The court then asked defendant's counsel whether, "[o]ther than his failure to
appear . . . do you have a legal reason as to why the defendant should not be
sentenced today?" Id. Counsel responded, "No, your Honor, except that I think it
would violate his due process rights and his right according to Rule 22 of the
Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has a right to . . . ." Id. Responding,

4
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the court stated that it would move forward with the case and then sentenced
defendant to a one-year term in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center. Id.
On May 11, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
entry includes the following findings:
1.

"On February 10, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea . . . [and] was
referred to AP&P for a pre-sentence report." R. 33.

2.

"On March 31, 2000, defendant, who was out of custody, appeared
personally before this court with his counsel . . . . No pre-sentence
report had been prepared so defendant was referred back to AP&P and
personally given a new sentencing date of May 5, 2000." Id.

3.

"On May 5th defendant once again failed fo obtain a pre-sentence report
and voluntarily failed to appear before this Court for sentencing." R.
33-34.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to the probable cause statement, defendant was riding one bike and
carrying another on January 20, 2000, when an officer stopped him to determine
whether both bikes were his. R. 3. Defendant was arrested when a computer
check revealed that he had outstanding warrants. Id. In a search incident to his
arrest, the officer found a plastic bag with a substance that field-tested positive for
methamphetamine. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Defendant claims that the trial court erred
when it sentenced him in absentia. However, "a defendant not accused of a capital

5
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crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence." State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). The trial court found that the
defendant, who was free on release, was given both oral and written notice of the
sentencing hearing. Thus, the court committed no error.
b. Defendant claims, nevertheless, that his absence could not be truly
voluntary where the court had not expressly told him that he could be sentenced in
absentia. No Utah precedent imposes this requirement, and the weight of other
precedent suggests that notice of the sentencing hearing is itself sufficient to meet
any statutory or Constitutional requirements.
2. Alleged reliance on inaccurate factual finding. Defendant claims that
the court relied on an erroneous finding that he had been absent from all
proceedings following his guilty plea. While the judge stated that defendant had
failed to show for any hearings following the plea, the record demonstrates that the
judge merely misstated himself and that he did not base his sentence on the
misstaken notion that defendant was absent from both the initial and the final
sentencing hearings.
3. Presentation of facts in mitigation, a. The court did not deny defense
counsel the opportunity to present information in mitigation. The record

• .' <

demonstrates that the court gave counsel an opportunity to speak and that counsel
did not offer or attempt to offer such information.
1

6
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b. Furthermore, even if error occurred, it was neither obvious nor harmful.
No appellate precedent outlines the procedures to be followed when a defendant is
absent or requires that a court make an explicit invitation to defense counsel to
present information in mitigation. Defendant does not indicate any new information
that he might have presented, and an absent defendant is an unlikely candidate for
probation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT, THE COURT
DID NOT ERR WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM IN ABSENTIA
A. Defendant who was free on release, waived his right to be present at
sentencing when he failed to appear.
Defendant claims that the trial court violated due process and Rule 22 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by sentencing him in absentia. He argues that
"the record does not establish that [he] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to be present and defend at sentencing." Br. Aplt. at 13. Defendant's argument is a
challenge to the court's finding of fact on this point, and appellate review is for
clear error.
U

[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at

sentencing by voluntary absence." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah
1996). "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence,

7
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defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P.
22(b). In non-capital cases, "the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant
had been present; . . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2).
Under rules 17 and 22, an absence is voluntary if the defendant has notice of
the proceedings and is at liberty to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated
elsewhere. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110, 1111.
Here, the trial court found that defendant "voluntarily failed to appear
for . . . sentencing." R. 34. This finding of fact was not clearly erroneous.
Defendant received both oral and written notice of the hearing. R. 27, 48:5.
Though not incarcerated, he failed to attend his interview with AP&P, resulting in a
non-bailable warrant for his arrest. R. 29. Nothing in the record suggests that he
was in custody. On the contrary, AP&P informed the court that defendant was not
in custody, at least as of April 25, 2000. R. 28. No evidence contradicts the court's
finding that defendant voluntarily chose to absent himself from the sentencing
hearing.
B. The court was not required to make an express warning that
defendant would be sentenced in absentia.

(

Defendant argues that, even conceding that he had notice, was not
incarcerated, and chose not to attend, his absence cannot be considered voluntary
8
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because the court did not tell him that it would proceed to sentencing in his absence.
Br. Aplt. at 16. This claim raises a question of law, and review is for correctness.
Defendant's contention finds little or no precedential support. Defendant cites
no Utah precedent for this position, and the State has discovered none. Defendant
cites only one case, United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in
support of this argument.1 McPherson addressed the right to be present at trial
codified by Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court
observed that McPherson was the only defense witness and that continuation of the
trial in his absence was tantamount to a guilty plea. It therefore ruled that the
defendant must be warned of or other otherwise know the consequences of his
absence, i.e., that if he "voluntarily absented himself he would be deemed to have
waived his constitutional right to testify and to confront the witnesses against him so
that the trial could continue without him." Id. at 1130.
The third member of the McPherson panel dissented, countering that "[t]he
right that was involved was the right to be present. Thus it follows that if the
defendant knew or should have known that he had a right to be present, his
voluntary absence . . . was a waiver of that 'known right.'" Id. at 1131.

l

The Utah Supreme Court has cited McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130, but only for the
proposition that "[t]o intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must
have notice of the proceedings." See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.
9
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McPherson was effectively overruled four years after its issuance. In Taylor
v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), a unanimous Supreme Court rejected a
defendant's argument that mere voluntary absence cannot constitute an effective
waiver of the right to be present at trial. Taylor argued that the record must also
show that the defendant "knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court not
only that he had a right to be present but also that the trial would continue in his
absence." Id. at 19. The Court reasoned, "It is wholly incredible to suggest that
petitioner, who was at liberty on bail, had attended the opening session of his trial,
and had a duty to be present at trial. . . entertained any doubts about his right to be
present at every stage of his trial. It seems equally incredible to us . . . that a
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of a trial. . . would not know
that as a consequence the trial would continue in his absence." Id. at 20 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). By its ruling in Taylor, the Supreme Court
affirmed a decision by a court of appeals that had expressly rejected McPherson.
See United States v. Taylor, 478 F.2d 689 (1 st Cir. 1973).
While the issue in the instant case arises in the context of sentencing rather
than guilt determination, the Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable here.
Defendant's voluntary absence waived the right at issue, i.e., "the right to be
present." Id. Defendant's suggestion that he did not clearly understand both that he

i
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had a right to be present at sentencing and that sentencing could continue in his
absence strains credibility.
Even in the specific context of a defendant's failure to appear at sentencing
after either a guilty plea or guilty verdict, a majority of courts have held that the
failure to appear constitutes voluntary absence and a waiver of a defendant's right to
be present. See Christopher Hall, Annotation, Voluntary Absence of Accused When
Sentence Is Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th 135 (1998). While a few courts have
required an express warning that sentencing will proceed in a defendant's absence,
the majority have not. See, e.g., United States ex rei Rosemond v. Smith, 1994 WL
119108, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that defendant may be sentenced in absentia
whether or not the court has specifically advised him of his right to be present as
sentencing); Wingate v. Scully, 764 F. Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (determining
that defendant who had deliberately failed to appear had waived his right to be
present even though court did not expressly state that he had a right to be present at
sentencing); see also Hall, supra.
The trial court's determination that defendant was voluntarily absent is
consistent with the weight of precedent in other jurisdictions. Notice that a
sentencing hearing will be held on a certain date is sufficient to inform a defendant
that he has a right to be present and that the hearing will be held-whether or not he

11
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chooses to attend. No specific warnings are required. The trial court correctly
determined that it could proceed to sentencing in defendant's absence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY ON AN INACCURATE FINDING OF
FACT WHEN IT DETERMINED THE SENTENCE
Defendant argues that the sentencing judge based his sentence on the
erroneous finding that defendant failed to appear at any court proceedings following
his guilty plea. See Br. Aplt. at 10. Defendant bases this argument on the judge's
statement at the May 5 sentencing hearing that defendant had pleaded guilty on
March 31, 2000, and "thereafter failed to show at any of the Court ordered hearings
and proceedings." R. 49:3.
The record demonstrates that the judge merely misstated himself. The plea
was entered in February. The case was then transferred to the sentencing judge, who
met with defendant at the initially scheduled sentencing hearing on March 31. R.,
10, 25, 48:2. At that hearing, he granted defendant a continuance to allow him
additional time to meet with AP&P for preparation of the presentence report and
advised him that his delays had placed him in a "precarious situation." R. 48:5. The
transcript of the May 5 sentencing hearing indicates that the judge rehearsed the
details of defendant's appearance before him at the March 31 hearing moments
before he stated that defendant had not shown at any hearing. The inaccuracy here
is just a misstatement. Clearly, the judge had not forgotten defendant's appearance
12
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at the March 31 hearing. Furthermore, the court's findings of fact and conclusions
of law expressly state that defendant appeared for sentencing on March 31. R. 33.
The record demonstrates that the judge did not base his sentencing determination on
the mistaken notion that defendant had been absent from all proceedings following
his guilty plea. See State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding
that misstatement did not represent court's reasoning).
Moreover, defendant did not appear at AP&P as ordered. He did not schedule
an interview in time to prepare the presentence report required for the initial
sentencing hearing. He did schedule an appointment with AP&P between the two
hearings; but when AP&P called to confirm the appointment, his family indicated
that he had not prepared his packet. AP&P then rescheduled the appointment, but
defendant did not appear.
Defendant's brief, relying on the minimal contacts associated with defendant's
failures to appear, states that defendant "was in contact with AP&P and scheduled
an appointment" after the plea hearing and "apparently contacted AP&P after the
March 31 hearing and scheduled an appointment." Br. Aplt. at 10. Defendant
suggests that the contact and the "apparent[]" contact are evidence that he attended
court ordered hearings or proceedings. A/, at 10-11.
These limited contacts, to the extent they occurred, in no way suggest that
defendant "showed up" at a court ordered hearing or proceeding. The contacts were

13
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not the interviews necessary to complete the presentence report and, in any event,
were not court ordered hearings or proceedings. The judge's factual findings are in
no way undermined by their failure to reference these contacts.
POINTIII
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT PREVENT COUNSEL FROM
PRESENTING INFORMATION IN MITIGATION
Defendant relies on rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Br.
Aplt. at 6. That rule provides, "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). "The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence." Id.
Defendant claims that the court "did not afford defense counsel the opportunity to
make a statement regarding the appropriate sentence" and did not "allow defense
counsel the opportunity to present any information in mitigation of sentence." Br.
Aplt. at 9.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate error. The trial court has substantial
discretion in conducting sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence. See State v.
San-wick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah
1985). As the transcript of this abbreviated sentencing proceeding demonstrates, the

14
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court never refused to hear counsel. Neither attorney requested the opportunity to be
heard (R. 49:2-4).
Defendant alleges that the sentencing judge foreclosed such requests when he
cut short defense counsel's discussion of defendant's right to be present. The
pertinent sections of the transcript read as follows:
THE COURT: The fact that the defendant entered a plea of guilty
on the 31st of March and was told both orally and in writing to be here
on today's date for sentencing, and to contact AP&P for the obtaining of
a presentence report, with no further word from him in the interim, leads
me to conclude that he has not chosen to comply with the terms of this
Court's order . . . . I will therefore proceed with the sentencing.
Other than his failure to appear, Ms. Garland, do you have a legal
reason as to why defendant should not be sentenced today?
MS. GARLAND: No, your Honor, except that I think it would
violate his due process rights and his right according to Rule 22 of the
Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has a right to THE COURT: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about that, but
I will determine at this point that's not going to delay the moving
forward of this case.
There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant should not be
sentenced . . . . I will order that he serve the time provided by law . . . .
R. 49:2-3. While the sentencing judge did interrupt counsel's argument regarding
defendant's right to be present, counsel did not attempt to present the "relevant and
reliable" evidence that defendant claims on appeal. See Br. Aplt. at 7. The court's
question, u[D]o you have a legal reason as to why defendant should not be sentenced
today," afforded defense counsel the "opportunity to make a statement and to present
15
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any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 22(a). By answering "No,
except that I think it would violated his due process rights . . . .," counsel implied
that she had nothing to address except the right to be present. Furthermore, nothing
in the record establishes or suggests that the court would have denied counsel the
opportunity had she later requested it.
Even assuming arguendo that the court should have expressly offered counsel
the opportunity to present mitigating information, the failure to do so did not
constitute plain error. To establish plain error, as defendant must since the claim is
unpreserved, he must show that (i) an error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and
(iii) the error was harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Error, if any, was not obvious. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial
court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court." See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). No appellate case
law outlines the procedures to be followed when a defendant is absent or requires
that a court make an express invitation to defense counsel to present information in
mitigation. If any error occurred, it was therefore not obvious.
Defendant points to precedent requiring sentencing judges to base their
exercise of discretion in fixing a sentence on reliable and relevant information. See
Br. Aplt. at 7. Specifically, he points to cases requiring that a criminal defendant be
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given a copy of the presentence report and opportunity to challenge any inaccuracies
in the report. See id. In the instant case, defendant's own failure to appear at AP&P
prevented the preparation of a presentence report. There was nothing to review and
nothing to challenge. Defendant also points to precedent that precludes the reliance
on unreliable hearsay in assessing a sentence. See id. at 8. However, defendant fails
to identify even one example of hearsay, reliable or not, upon which sentencing was
based. No obvious error occurred.
Furthermore, even if error occurred and even if such error were obvious, it
was nonetheless harmless. The mitigating factors that might have been offered, as
detailed by appellant's brief, were defendant's work at two jobs, his interaction with
pretrial services, and his attendance at substance abuse classes. See Br. Aplt. at 12.
Defendant suggests that this information made him a candidate for probation and
treatment rather than for imprisonment. See id.
Any error is harmless, first, because the sentencing judge had already been
informed of these possibly mitigating factors. This information was presented to the
sentencing judge at the initially scheduled sentencing hearing. See R. 48:3.
Defendant, in fact, cites to that hearing in detailing the factors in his brief. See Br.
Aplt at 12.
Any error is harmless, second, because the likelihood of probation in this case
was close to nil. Even had the sentencing judge been reminded of the factors

17
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rehearsed at the initial sentencing hearing, defendant's record of irresponsibility and
unreliability and his failure to appear at the continued sentencing hearing altered the
sentencing calculus. Defendant had failed to arrange for timely interviews with
AP&P prior to the first sentencing hearing and therefore came to the hearing with no
presentence report. When he was given another opportunity to meet with AP&P, he
failed to appear. When notified of this failure, the sentencing judge ordered the
issuance of a non-bailable warrant for his arrest. Finally, when defendant failed to
appear for the rescheduled sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced him in absentia.
Whatever mitigating information might have been presented, defendant could not
have been considered a good candidate for probation and the requirements of
probation. Rather, had it been necessary, the court would have been "entitled to
aggravate appellant's sentence on the basis of his failure to appear." State v.
Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz. App. 1986). "Actions such as appellant's
absconding from the jurisdiction demonstrate a poor attitude and have been
specifically held to provide appropriate bases for sentence aggravation." Id.
Error, if there was any, was harmless. Any mitigating information had already
been presented and, in any event, an absent defendant is an unlikely candidate for
probation.

18
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION IS REQUESTED
This appeal presents no issues of sufficient complexity or novelty to merit
setting the matter for oral argument or issuing a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on October)J_,2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JEANNE B. INOUYE
/Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

-vsJASON EDWARD PAYNE,

CaseNo.001902000FS
Judge Frederick

Defendant.
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on May 5,2000. The State
of Utah was represented by its counsel, David E. Yocom and Matthew G. Nielsen, and the
defendant, who was not present, was represented by Andrea Garland
FINDINGS OF FACT
On February 10,2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above entitled-matter to
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge Roger A.
Livingston. Defendant was referred to AP&P for a pre-sentence report. On March 31,2000,
defendant, who was out of custody, appeared personally before this Court for sentencing with his
counsel, Andrea Garland. No pre-sentence report had been prepared so defendant was referred
back to AP&P and personally given a new sentencing date of May 5, 2000. On May 5th
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defendant once again failed to obtain a pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to appear
before this Court for sentencing
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rule 22 specifically states, "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(b). Because defendant and his counsel were both given personal notice of the May
5th sentencing and defendant failed to appear for his pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to
appear for his sentencing, defendant is hereby sentenced in his absence. Furthermore, defendant
has waived any right to be present by his voluntary absence after being given personal notice.
ORDER
Based on defendant's voluntary absence, defendant is hereby sentenced in abstentia for
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, to the
following: One year in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Complex, forthwith.
DATED this j j ^ d a y of May 2000.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on the y(

day of May 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be mailed to LDA, Attorney for
Defendant, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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STATE OF UTAH,
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Case No. 001902000
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Electronically recorded on
March 31, 2000

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Third District Court Judge
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For the State:
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Deputy County Attorney
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Salt Lake Legal Defenders
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Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444
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-2P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on March 31f 2000)
THE COURT: Call case No. CR002000. Ms. Garland,
you're appearing on behalf of this defendant?
MS. GARLAND: Yes, I am, your Honor.
THE COURT: And you are Jason Edward Payne; is that
correct?
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Ms. Garland is your lawyer; is that
correct?
MR. PAYNE: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, you're here on behalf of the
State?
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: For the record, the defendant entered a
plea of guilty on a Class A misdemeanor charge of attempted
possession of a controlled substance. These events occurred —
that is, the plea part of it occurred —

on the 10th of February

of this year.
A presentence report was ordered.

There has been no

report received, for the reason, apparently, that the defendant
failed or refused to appear at the Office of Adult Probation
and Parole.
MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, he didn't receive —

he did

fail to go there. He has since gone there, your Honor, has
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-3filled out his paperwork.
was working two jobs.

The problem was, your Honor, that he

He didn't realize he needed to be up to

AP&P as soon as he did need to.
He's been doing very well with pretrial services.
He's been keeping up with pretrial services, checking in.
He's been attending LDS substance abuse classes.

I've got

some paperwork here confirming that, if you'd like to see it.
So my request is that we continue the sentencing, and
that he be allowed to go to AP&P.

He's made an appointment

with them for this coming week to have a presentence interview,
and they told him that they would not be able to do that in
time for sentencing.

So my request is that we continue this

and allow him to go back to AP&P and keep his appointment, and
that we set this over.
THE COURT: Why didn't you keep your appointment when
you were told to report on the 10th —

on or about the 10th of

February?
MR. PAYNE: Your Honor, I went to —

I called them.

They were going to start doing my presentence report over the
phone, but I didn't have my case number and whatnot.

So I

went down there on my own, and I needed to get my proof of my
employment, which I have, and my high school diploma, which I
do have now.

I've also got the paperwork that they gave me

right here also.

They told me that they need more time to do

my presentence report.
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THE COURT: So when did you go down there?
MR. PAYNE: Two weeks ago, your Honor, and they said
they needed more time. My pretrial worker told me to ask for
a continuance so that they could finish the presentence report.
THE COURT: I'm not in the business of accommodating
late preparation of reports normally.
MR. PAYNE: I've got it completed right here, sir, and
also I've got six —
THE COURT: Are you on pretrial service release now or
bail?
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir, pretrial release.
THE COURT: What's the State's position, Mr. Esqueda?
MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, I don't show any failure to
appears on this case.
THE COURT: Well, we haven't been notified of it.
MR. ESQUEDA: No.
THE COURT: Oh, you mean, on prior occasions?
MR. ESQUEDA: On prior occasions.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. ESQUEDA: If the Court is inclined to give him
another opportunity, we would have no objection.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lane, do you have any contrary
information from what's being told us here?
MR. LANE: No, I do not, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Payne, is it starting to dawn upon you
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the seriousness of the way I treat these matters?
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: We will this time continue your sentencing
to allow AP&P to prepare the report, but do not fail to attend
to their meetings again; do you understand me?
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I haven't got the time to repeatedly see
defendants who fail to keep appointments.

We'll continue the

matter to —
COURT CLERK: May 5th.
THE COURT: — May the 5th at 8:30.
morning.

That's a Friday

Now, Mr. Payne, you've already been over there.

I'm

going to tell you now, and I don't want you to forget it.

You

go to that office as soon as you leave this courtroom.
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you tell them the situation, the very
precarious situation you're in, and you need to get that report
completed.

Is that clear to you?

MR. PAYNE: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, you're on release subject to certain
terms and conditions, and you will continue to follow those
terms and conditions, Mr. Payne.

Do you understand me?

MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir, I do.
THE COURT: All right.

Counsel, that'll be the order.

(Hearing concluded.)
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Clerk of the Court

-2P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on May 5, 2000)
MS. GARLAND: Good morning, your Honor.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MS. GARLAND: Andrea Garland on behalf of Jason Payne.
He's No. 15 on your calendar.
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Jason Edward Payne,
case No. CR002000.

Ms. Garland, you are appearing on behalf of

the defendant, Mr. Payne.

He's not with us, apparently.

MS. GARLAND: I've not seen him, your Honor.

I've not

heard from him.
THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, are you here for the State?
MR. NIELSEN: I am, your Honor.
THE COURT: A warrant has been previously issued for
Mr. Payne.

However, given the circumstance that you've had no

contact with him, this Court has had no contact with him, I am
assuming that his failure to appear here today is a voluntary
happenstance.
MS. GARLAND: Since I haven't heard from him, we can't
really draw that conclusion, Judge*
THE COURT: Well, but we can in the interim, until I'm
persuaded to the contrary.

The fact that the defendant entered

a plea of guilty on the 31st of March and was told both orally
and in writing to be here on today's date for sentencing, and
to contact AP&P for the obtaining of a presentence report, with
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-3no further word from him in the interim, leads me to conclude
that he has not chosen to comply with the terms of this Court's
order and another Court's order.

I will therefore proceed with

the sentencing.
Other than his failure to appear, Ms. Garland, do
you have a legal reason as to why the defendant should not be
sentenced today?
MS. GARLAND: No, your Honor, except that I think it
would violate his due process rights and his right according to
Rule 22 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has
a right to

—

THE COURT: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about
that, but I will determine at this point that's not going to
delay the moving forward of the case.
There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant
should not be sentenced, it appears to this Court, based upon
the record, that on the 31st of March of this year he entered
a plea of guilty to a Class A misdemeanor crime of attempted
possession of a controlled substance.

He has thereafter failed

to show at any of the Court ordered hearings and proceedings.
Accordingly I will order that he serve the term
provided by law in the Adult Detention Center for a period of
one year.

I will order that he be committed forthwith to that

institution.
Mr. Nielsen, you prepare the appropriate findings of
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fact, conclusions of law and order of voluntary absence.
MR. NIELSEN: Okay.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Garland.
MS. GARLAND: Thank you, your Honor.
have before you this morning.

That's all that I

May I be excused?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Thank you.

(Hearing concluded.)
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